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ABSTRACT
Large and persistent differences across industries inwages paid for given
occupations have commonly been observed. Recently, the efficiencywage model
(EWN) has been advanced as an explanation for thesewage differentials. The
shirking version of the EWM assumes a trade—off between self—supervision and
external supervision.The turnover version assumes turnover is costly to the
firm.Variation across firms in the cost of monitoring/shirkingor turnover
then are hypothesized to account for wage variation across firms forhomogeneous workers.
This paper presents empirical evidence of the trade—off ofwage premiums
for supervisory intensity and turnover. A new sample of 200 firms inone sector
in one state in 1982 is analyzed. Little evidence Is found tosupport either
version of EWM. The substantial variation inwages for narrowly defined occu-







Large and persistent differences in pay for a given occupation are commonly
observed across establishments and industries.If both workers and jobs are
homogeneous, such differences are not predicted by standard theory. Such
findings have then been taken as the basis for more complex theories ofwage
determination.
Principal—agent models extend standard theory to cases of imperfect in-
formation.This paper examines the particular case in which employees cannot
directly and costlessly observe a worker's effort or output. The monitoring
problem may be addressed either by purchasing more direct supervision, or by
purchasing self—supervision.The latter choice results in what appear to be
occupation and firm specific wage premiums.The aim of this paper is to de-
termine whether there is evidence to support monitoring problems as an expla-
nation for differences across plants in occupational wages. In particular, this
paper searches for empirical evidence of a trade—off in production between
supervision and wage premiums.
A second version of the efficiency wage model explainswage premiums as a
mechanism to reduce turnover.Firms which find turnover particularly costly
will find it profitable to offer wage bonuses so as to reduce turnover. This
paper also offers empirical evidence of the tradeoff between turnover and wage
premi ums.
These two variants of the efficiency wage hypothesis are discussed further
in the next section. The accumulated evidence on industry and establishment
differences in occupational wages is surveyed in Section 3. Section 4 describes
the plant level data on wages and supervision analyzed here.Tests of the
trade—off between wage premiums and supervision are presented in Section 5.Section 6 presents tests of the effect ofwage bonuses on turnover. The con-
clusions follow.
2.Efficiency Wage Models
The foundations of efficiency wage theory are reviewed by Katz (1986), from
which this section draws.Following Yellen (1984), consider an economy of




e =Theefficiency function giving the effort of the worker,
>0,e'1 <0




The profit maximizing firm chooses both the level ofwages, and the quantity






In other words at the
the wage is equal to 1.
The second condition i
price. This model has
optimal wage, the elasticity of effort with respect to
This minimizes wage costs per efficiency unit of labor.
s standard:marginal product equals marginal factor
been offered as an explanation both for unfallingwages
2in the face of unemployment, and for wage dispersion across firms for identical
workers.
This basic efficiency wage model has been developed in a number of versions
(Akerlof, 1984; Stoft, 1982).The shirking and turnover variants concern us
here. The shirking model is driven by imperfect information: the firm cannot
perfectly observe the effort or output of workers, and supervision is costly.
The firm cannot impose "ultimate" sanctions on employees: threats of infinite
cost (hanging) sufficient to compel non—shirking with infinitesimal super-
vision.Nor can firms fine, sue, or extract performance bonds from workers.
Piece rates are also assumed to be impracticable given the difficulty of ob-
serving effort or output. The firm's problem is then to develop an effort—
eliciting pay mechanism. Wage premiums may offer the appropriate incentives
for self—supervision.Such shirking models are developed in Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) and the earlier literature reviewed there.
Wage dispersion for identical workers arises in such models because of
differences across firms in 1) the cost of monitoring, and 2) the cost to the
firm of employee shirking. The level of such bonuses depends in turn on 3) the
expected duration of employment.
The turnover variant of the efficiency wage model is similar in structure
to the shirking variant. Assume firms bear part of the costs of turnover, and
that turnover decreases with wages.Firms with higher turnover costs have an
incentive to pay high relative wages to reduce turnover. See Salop (1979) and
Stiglitz (1974). Firms also have an incentive to use tenure bonuses, or to have
workers post bonds or pay for their own hiring and training costs. For evidence
against the use of tenure bonuses, see Abraham and Farber (1985) and Altonji
and Shakotko (1985).Where these alternatives are restricted, the turnover
3model predicts that high wages, associated with high turnovercosts, will cause
lower turnover rates. This is an empirically testable proposition.
3. Past Studies: Industry Wage Effects
To my knowledge, there have been no past studies of the efficiencywage
hypothesis at the level of the firm.'This appears to be due to the absence
of requisite information in the commonly used data sets, and to therarity of
any studies of firms.
There is a lo'ng tradition showing differences inwages paid in the same
occupation across industries. Dunlop (1957), for example, shows that in Boston
in 1951, the industry with the highest pay for truck drivers paid 1.88 times
as much as the lowest paying industry. He ascribes these substantial differ-
ences to underlying differences in product markets.
Slichter (1950) finds a high rank correlation (.71 in 1939) of unskilled
and skilled wages in an industry. At any point in time, sucha positive cor-
relation of unskilled and skilled wages could reflecta transitory demand shock
temporarily driving up industry wages along a short—run inelastic supplycurve.
If so, we would not expect to see the same industriesstay at the top of the
wage distribution decade after decade. Yet, industry wage differentialsappear
to be remarkably persistent over time.Slichter (1950), Cullen (1956), Reder
(1962), Montgomery and Stockton (1985), Bell and Freeman (1975), andKrueger
and Summers (1987) all present evidence of persistentindustry wage differen-
tials over differing periods ranging from 1895 to 1984.Taken together this
is a century of persistent and largely unexplainedindustry wage effects.
4Behind the Industry Wage Effect
Two regularities appear to stand out from studies thatattempt to account
for systematic differences in pay within occupationsacross plants or indus-
tries. Higher wages are usually associated with 1) higher profitsor concen-
tration, and 2) larger plants and larger firms (the sizewage effect).The
chief suspect in this search is product market power. Ability topay appears
to be associated with industry wage premiums.Dickens and Katz (1987), and
Krueger and Summers (1987) offer useful reviews.
A strong, positive relationship between wages and plant or firm size is
also persistently observed, see Brown and Medoff (1984), and the literature
reviewed there. Assuming that direct supervision is more difficult in larger
plants and companies, this has been taken as direct evidence in favor of the
efficiency wage hypothesis.
It is not obvious why the owners of a firm should share their economic rents
with their workers, although the morale version of the efficiencywage model
offers a possible explanation.Unobserved quality differences in workers
leading to both higher wages and profits offers another, Cain (1976). From the
perspective •of the shirking model, it is troublesome that wage differentials
tend to be dominated by employer, rather than occupation effects (Nolan and
Brown, 1983), and that at the establishment level much of the differential is
accounted for by the unionization and gender of the workers (Groshen,1985).
Tests of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis
The earliest applications of the efficiencywage hypothesis were to the
output and pay of agricultural workers near starvation. The output effects of
wage bonuses in developed economies have not yet been shown.Two provocative
and interesting recent studies set the stage for such tests (Dickens and Katz,
51987; Krueger and Summers, i987). They present a variety of evidence suggesting
that neither transitory demand shifts, unobserved human capital, nor compen-
sating differentials can easily account for the observed industry wage differ-
entials, which persist across time and countries. However, the advantage of
efficiency wage models in explaining these wage differentials remains to be
shown.
More direct tests of the efficiency wage hypothesis are offered by Krueger
and Summers (1987), who show that wage premiums are (1) negatively associated
with quits, and (2) positively associated with tenure and with self—reported
effort and job discretion. In both cases, the effects do not appear to be large
enough to make the payment of wage premiums profitable, and both may reflect
unobserved quality differences.
4. Data
All of the data analyzed here come from a survey of employment conditions
in the high—technology sector of one state. In 1982 this survey includes more
than 200 plants with more than 70,000 employees. Employees are placed into one
of 290 narrow occupational classifications. For each occupation in each plant,
the number of employees and average pay are reported.In most cases, a plant
is the sole operating asset of a firm, so one could use the terms interchange-
ably.
This study analyzes average pay by occupation by plant, which is theaverage
of the base pay rate for individuals in a single occupation. It includes
cost—of—living or geographic differentials, and excludes shift differentials,
lead premiums, or other differentials which are not considered base pay. Extra
compensation which is not regularly paid and considered as part of the normal
base pay is excluded.Commissions and incentive pay which are part of total
6targeted earnings are included.In other words, for incentive pay jobs, the
expected value of total pay is reported, deviations from the expected value are
not. The pay and employment2 data anaiyzed here are for thepay period closest
to Sepfember 1, 1982.Wage bonuses are taken here as the deviation of plant
wages by occupation from the sample mean.
Firms are provided with 290 detailed job descriptions that reflect the
normal range of duties, responsibilities and requirements found in each level
of the specified job. Employees that do not match a job description by at least
roughly 80 percent are to be excluded. The job descriptions are detailed, and
the occupational classifications narrow.3
Data on supervision comes from the same survey. Organizational charts
showing hierarchies and time allocation of supervisors are not available. In-
stead, for a number of occupations, matching supervisor or manager occupations
are reported. For example, the relation of order processing clerks, purchasing
assistants, and field service workers to the occupations of order processing
supervisors, purchasing manager, and field service supervisor is readilyap-
parent.
I have limited the analysis to sets of workers andsupervisors for which
the supervisory relationship seemed complete and exclusive from thejob
descriptions.4Absent an actual organizational chart, error cannot bepre-
cluded.In particular, supervisory intensity is incorrectly low wherehigher
or lateral supervisors oversee a particular operation, and it is incorrectly
high where direct supervisors oversee other occupations in addition to the ones
specified here.5
Throughout this paper I assume that the very detailed occupational clas-
sifications used here serve as a control on worker quality that is at leastas
good, If not better than, the commonly used age and education measures. Note
7also that this data is bought and paid for by the participants, rather than by
academicians or the government. By the market test of survival, it hasproven
its usefulness to survey participants, and that usefulness depends onaccuracy
and reliability. In particular, the occupational categories used in thesurvey
are those that participating firms believe best reflect their own jobs.
5. The Tradeoff of Wage Premiums for Supervisory Intensity
In theory, considering the same occupation in different firms, the effi-
ciency wage model predicts that firms employing more supervisors per worker will
offer lower wage premiums. Supervisor intensity and wage bonuses are substi-
tutes in production. This section presents tests of the tradeoff between wage
premiums and intensity of supervision for six occupations in subsamples of 19
to 111 manufacturing plants.Consider a production function of the general
form:
-
(4) Q =Q[e(P,S/L)L] e1,e2, >0
e 22' e12 <0
where:
Q =output
P =wagepremium for workers
S/L =ratioof supervisors to workers
e =effortfunction
Along an isoquant, higher levels of P are associated with lower levels of
SIL.In principle, this is testable. In practice, the usefulness of any such
test will depend critically on 1) the ability to control for variations in
output Q, and 2) the ability to hold occupation fixed, or control for the cost
of shirking. For the former, this section relies on measures of number of em—
8ployees; for the latter it relies on the use of occupations narrowly defined
within one industry by industry participants.
To test for substitution bbtween two factors of production,by regressing
one (wage premiums) on the other (supervisory intensity) is by no means an ideal
procedure, and is open to a number of criticisms, many of which are shared by
substantial parts of the production function literature. First, factor mixis
in theory a function of factor prices, and perhaps scale. Withina single in-
dustry in a single geographic area, one might expect little variation in factor
prices. Without such variation, the elasticity of substitution in production
cannot be well identified.What variation is observed may then represent
transient optimization errors, rather than the production function. Second,
the choices of levels for both factors of production are endogenous and jointly
determined. In this case, the error term in the wage equationmay be correlated
with the measure of supervisory intensity.I attempt to control for variations
in output quantity by including a measure for number •of workers on the right
hand side. This is obviously troublesome because labor input is itself
endogenous. If output is not adequately controlled for, or if what is labelled
a single occupation here is not homogeneous with respect to shirking costs, then
this procedure biases towards finding a positive correlation betweensupervi-
sory intensity and wage premiums.This makes any finding of a tradeoff more
compelling, but renders the precise interpretation of a positive correlation
doubtful.The results to be presented here should be interpreted with this
caution in mind. With longitudinal data, one could try to limit thescope of
such problems by estimating first difference equations.
The first question to be addressed is whether thereis a substantial
occupation—specific element of wage differentials, or alternatively, whether
the firm effect on wages is similar across occupation. The shirking model is
9consistent with the former but not the latter case, because it predicts dif-
ferent monitoring difficulties across occupation, rather than a constant firm
effect across occupations. Among the compelling pieces of evidence against the
shirking model so far is the finding (Dickens and Katz, 1987) in CPS data of
highly correlated industry effects across occupations.
To test whether firm effects on wages are highly correlated across occu-
pations, I select six common occupations in which shirking or heterogeneity are
likely to be a relatively minor problem. Table 1 shows the correlation coef-
ficients for these six occupations across subsamples of 48 to 91 companies.
Most of the occupational wages are positively correlated with each other, and
a number of these are significant, but there are also a number of insignificant
and negative correlations.Firms that pay high wages in one of these occupa-
tions do not also pay high wages in the others. Wage differentials across firms
do not simply reflect a constant firm effect, but also reflect occupation—
specific components. This result stands in contrast to the Dickens and Katz
finding of strong industry wage effects across occupations, using more aggre-
gated occupations and industries. Aggregation across occupations, and firms
would tend to average out distinctions, and so could help explain the difference
between these two results.The finding here of little constant firm effect
across narrowly defined occupations leaves scope for the shirking model. At
the same time this finding casts doubt on simple equity theories which hy-
pothesize strong firm effects on wages across occupations.
Table 2 presents characteristics of the sample for six additional occupa-
tions chosen using the following criteria:1) they are found in substantial
numbers in a large proportion of companies; 2) they have clearly defined
supervisors who are likely to supervise the respective workers and no one else;
3) they appear to have only one set of direct supervisors; 4) they appear to
10be homogeneous across firms; and 5) effortmay not be easily observable and
failure to perform may be costly to the firm.No other occupations fulfilled
these criteria, although their application obviously involvespersonal judge—
ment.
There is indeed substantial variation across firms in a singleindustry
and area in the average wage paid to workers. The coefficient ofvariation of
wages among these occupations ranges from .14 field service workers to .22 for
testers and machinists.In five of these occupations, the firm paying the
highest average wage pays more than twice the lowest averagewage. This is the
sort of wage dispersion that industrial relations experts have long pointedout,
and which efficiency wage theory now attempts to explain.
The occupations in Table 2 are ordered from lowest to highestaverage wage.
If one thought these occupations differed greatly in cost ofshirking but had
similar factor price ratios of external to self—supervision, then thesuper-
vision to worker ratios should follow the same ranking. Table 2 showsno gen-
eral evidence that differential shirking costs acrossoccupations dominate
twists in factor price ratios and result in both higher supervisory ratios and
higher costs. Note that outlying firms with zero supervisors in a given occu-
pation, or with more supervisors than workers, have been excluded from the
sample.
Within occupations there is no significant evidence of a tradeoff between
wage premiums and supervisory intensity.Table 3 shows the results of re-
gressions of worker wages on the ratio of supervisors to workers. If shirkers
are more of a potential problem in larger units, and if scale effectsdominated
this data (or if workers demanded a compensating differentialfor working under
supervisors), we would expect to see strong positive correlations between wages
and supervisory intensity. If the efficiency wage hypothesis played an impor—
11tant role in explaining wage premiums, we would expect to see astrong negative
coefficient on the supervisor variable. What we actually see in Table 3can
best be described as noise, compounded in some cases by fewdegrees of freedom.
There is substantial variation in wages in these occupations, but thereis
little evidence that the efficiency wage model helps toexplain this
variation.6 In otherregressions (not shown) of the average workers' wage ag-
gregated over all occupations, aggregate supervising intensity again has an
insignificant and small effect.7
Factor Quantities as a Function of Factor Prices
This section tests for substitution between factors of productionby re-
gressing the ratio of factor quantities on the ratio of factor prices.In the
usual application this has the virtue of relegating the endogenous variables
to the left hand side. The results of regressions of the ratio ofsupervisors
to workers on the ratio of supervisors' wages to workers'wages are presented
in Table 4.In each of the occupations, firms not reporting supervisors, or
supervisors' wages are deleted from the sample. Controls for detailed industry,
area, and scale are included.
As the standard theory predicts, the wages of supervisors relativeto
workers increases when the ratio of supervisors to workers employed falls. This
effect is found in all occupations except testers, but is onlysignificant in
the case of machinists.The interpretation of this effect is complicated in
efficiency wage models because wages are choice variables.It is clear that
firms that pay higher wages to workers (relative to supervisors) ——eitherbe-
cause they have to or they choose to ——employfewer workers (relative to
supervisors). The negative correlation between supervisory intensity and
12workers' wages (so a positive coefficient in theseregressions) predicted by
the shirking model is not generallyapparent in these estimates.8
Output, Supervisory Intensity and
A production function may be characterized byobserving how output varies
as inputs change. The inputs in question here, supervisory intensity and
workers' wages, are observed. The output of workers is notdirectly observed.
Table 5 assumes that firm output is correlated with firm sales.This is a noisy
measure of the relevant output, and is available only for a subset of firms.
Table 5 shows regressions of sales on supervisoryintensity, the average wage
of non—supervisory employees, total employment and theset of dichotomous var-
iables for industry and area.Neither higher wages nor more supervisorsper
worker are significantly associated withgreater sales conditional on total
employment.
6. Turnover and Wage Premiums
In its short history, efficiency wage theory has quicklyspawned a number
of different varieties. Now I turn from the shirking version to theturnover
version.The hypothesis is that wage bonuses are profitably paid to reduce
costly turnover. This section investigates whether turnover is lower inhigh
wage firms, whether this can explain much of the observed wage dispersion, and
whether the wage bonuses are efficient in the sense that theypay for themselves
through reductions in turnover.
For each of 200 plants I observe the total number of separations-among
non—exempt (non—managerial) employees over the previous 6 months, along with
total employment of non—exempt employees at the beginning (March 1982) of this
6—month period.I calculate the mean wage paid by each firm to non—exempt em—
-
13ployees by weighting mean firm wages for detailed non—exempt occupations by
employment share of each occupation in each firm.Separations include quits,
fires, and retirements, but should not include temporary layoffs.Unfortu-
nately, I subtract out the retirements, but this is a small proportion
of all separations. The turnover rate for each firm is calculated as the ratio
(for non—exempt workers) of total separations over the previous 6 months to
total employment at the beginning of that period. Turnoveraverages 25% per
half year in the firms sampled here.9
The turnover version of the efficiency wage model predicts that higherwages
cause lower turnover, and more distinctively that wage premiums increase until
the point that marginal reductions in turnover do not add to profits. Table 6
presents the results of regressions of turnover rates on wages for 200 firms.
Column 1 presents an unadorned simple regression. Column 2 presents a multiple
regression with controls for total employment, occupational composition, in-
dustry and area. These additional controls reduce the wage effect on turnover
by 14%.In both cases, the first prediction of the efficiency wage model is
borne out: higher wages are associated with lower turnover, and the result is
statistically significant. But note that a number of other models predict the
same result.In particular, a model of accidents predicts this.A smaller
proportion of workers is expected to quit at any firm that accidentally pays
higher wages.
The important questions are 1) whether this association is strong enough
to explain a substantial part of wage variation across firms, 2) whether it is
profitable.In both cases, the answer appears to be no.In the first case,
while there is considerable variation in both turnover and wages, the former
is not highly enough correlated with the latter to account for its variation.
14The second question can be addressed by asking how high themarginal cost
of turnover would have to be to justify the observedwage premiums. Suppose,
as in the first equation of Table 6, that an additional dollar of'wages per
worker per hour reduces turnover by 3.6 percentage pointsper worker per half—
year. For convenience, think of this as a 3.6 percentage point decrease in the
probability that the representative worker turns over per half—year. Assuming
a 2080 (52x40) hour work year, this result is achieved at a marginal cost of
$2080 per worker—year. For a risk neutral firm, this is profitable only if the
marginal cost of turnover exceeds $57,777.Because the wage bonus effect on
turnover is small, payment of such bonuses only profitably reduce turnover if
the benefits of actual turnover reduction exceeded 28 times the cost.In view
of the fact that workers in this sample average an annualpay of $15,500, such
exorbitant turnover expenses may be ruled out.
Higher wages are associatedwith lower turnover, as the efficiency wage
model (among others) predicts, but the reduction in turnover achieved by such
wages premiums hardly justifies the payment of observed wage premiums as a
profit maximizing act.1°
7. Conclusion
The shirking version of the efficiency wage model makes a strong prediction
that self—supervision is a substitute in production for external supervision.
This paper tests for evidence of a trade—off betweenwage premiums and super-
visory intensity. While all of the tests presented here are subject to serious
qualification, little evidence is found to support the hypothesis. There is
little evidence that the considerable differences in occupationalwages paid
across firms can be accounted for by the shirking model.
15This paper has shown that there are large differentials in wages paid within
narrow occupations between plants in the high—technology sector of a single
state. Take the very narrowness of the occupational definitions used as a good
control for unobserved worker quality. Assume that the concentration of em-
ployees in one industry in one state controls for much of unobserved location,
union threat, or industry effects. Under these assumptions, the results here
of wide wage dispersion across firms remains a puzzle from the perspective of
both of the competing theories.
The turnover version of the efficiency wage model predicts that wage bonuses
are paid up to the point at which further reductions in turnover cease adding
to profits. This paper presents evidence that higher wages are indeed associ-
ated with lower turnover rates, but that the reductions in turnover achieved
are not sufficient to establish the profitability of wage bonuses.
Wages for narrowly defined occupations within one sector of one state are
widely dispersed. Neither the shirking nor the turnover variants of the effi-
ciency wage model appear able to explain this dispersion. The task that remains
for contemporary wage theory is to provide evidence supporting an explanation
for this observed wage dispersion.
16Footnotes
1. Since writing this, two others have appeared:Xrueger (1987) and Levine
(1987).
2. Part—time employees who regularly work over 20 hoursper week and are eli-
gible for pro—rated normal benefits are reported at their full—time equiv-
alents. Temporary or seasonal employees are excluded unless theyare paid
as are full—time regular employees. Those on job—shop rates are excluded.
3.For some occupations, two or more levels of the job are reported, forex-
ample Field Service "B" and Field Service "A'.In such cases I take the
total of employment in each of the subclassifications, and the weighted
average of pay.
4. Where more than one level of supervision is reported, I take thesum of
employment and the weighted average of pay.
5. It is not clear that firms have an incentive to act strategically inre-
porting wages. Any individual response has a negligible effect on reported
averages. In addition, a firm may cause comparable damage to a competitor
by fooling it into paying wages above market as by fooling it into below
market wages. Given the high level of "trading" in this concentrated mar-
ket, market price is a difficult secret to keep.
6. The analysis in Table 3 excludes firms that report zero supervisors in the
sample. This has no effect of note on the results.
177. There is also no evidence of asize—wage effect, at this detailed level of
analysis, with size measured as number of employees withina given occupa-
tional group.
8. Table 4 also shows no significantscale, industry or area effects on the
supervisor—to—worker ratio, although there are differences in thisratio
across occupations.
9.It ranges from 0 to 1.7. The meanwage of non—exempt workers in these firms
is $7.45, ranging from $4.99 to $11.13.The firms in this sample average
144 non—exempt employees, ranging from 3 to 2,444. Boththe turnover rate
and the mean wage of non—exempt employeesvary across firms because of
changes in the occupational composition of thenon—exempt work force.In
the analysis that follows, I control for each firm'soccupational composi-
tion by including control variables giving theproportion of each firm's
non—exempt employment in each of 7 occupationalgroups. The average wage
here, conditional on this broad occupational distribution,may not pre-
cisely capture the wage bonuses within detailedoccupations relevant to
efficiency wage models.
10. Table 6 also contains other results of interest. Somehave theorized that
turnover is a greater problem at large plants because ofa greater sense
of alienation. Here, I observe lower turnover rates atlarger plants, al-
though the effect is small and insignificant. Design and drafting
workers,
and operative have (insignificantly) higher turnover rates thando elec-
tronic technicians. Across industries, turnover ratesare significantly
higher in computer equipment, medical equipment, and electronicinstru—
18ments, by 14 to 20 percentage points.Obviously, other factors besides
wages (such as promotion prospects, or quaLity of supervision) are of im-
portance in exp1ainng turnover.
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22Table 1: Correlation of Firm Effectson Wages Across Six Occupations
Shipping
PBX Accounting Light Truck Receiving Drafter
ReceptionistClerk B Operator Clerk A B
Secretary A .33 .28 .09 .23 .24
(.005) (.007) (.47) (.05) (.06) 69 91 61 73 61
PBX Receptionist .13 .35 —.05 .23
(.27) (.009) (.71) (.12)
73 54 62 48
Accounting Clerk 8 .38 —.007 .15
(.001) (.95) (.25)
70 83 64
Light Truck Operator .34 .23
(.009) (.08)
58 57
Shipping—Receiving Clerk A —.18
(.18)
58
Note: First line is correlation coefficient, secondis p—value; third is
sarnpTe size.
23Table 2: Sample Characteristics for Six Occupations
Mean S.D. Mm Max
Production Assemblers (Nr118)
II Employees 88.46 527.04 1.00 5731.00
Avg. Wage of Employees 6.33 1.10 4.29 9.88
# Supervisors 10.30 61.98 1.00 675.00
Avg. Wage of Supervisors 13.60 2.56 8.08 23.32
Ratio (Supervisor/Workers) 0.23 0.24 0.02 1.00
Testers (N=23)
# Employees 19.61 60.55 1.00 296.00
Avg. Wage 7.09 1.55 5.08 11.94
# Supervisors 9.48 35.24 1.00 171.00
Avg. Wage 13.95 2.77 8.00 20.53
Ratio Supervisors/Workers 0.48 0.31 0.06 1.00
Order Processing Clerk (N=37)
# Employees 10.14 45.12 1.00 277.00
Avg. Wage 7.26 1.20 4.77 11.83
II Supervisors 2.35 7.89 1.00 49.00
Avg. Wage 11.69 2.03 7.13 17.01
Ratio 0.54 0.31 0.13 1.00
Machinists (N25)
# Employees 20.24 64.12 1.00 327.00
Avg. Wage 7.94 1.71 4.43 12.13
# Supervisors 3.92 10.72 1.00 55.00
Avg. Wage 14.46 2.23 9.50 18.75
Ratio Supervisors/Workers 0.37 0.31 0.07 1.00
Maintenance Worker (N=28)
# Employees 11.14 41.98 1.00 225.00
Avg. Wage 8.85 1.89 5.90 12.50
# Supervisors 2.46 6.97 1.00 38.00
Avg. Wage 14.25 1.97 10.58 19.38
Ratio Supervisor/Employees 0.58 0.36 0.11 1.00
Field Service (N26)
# Employees 35.62 114.04 1.00 587.00
Avg. Wage 10.53 1.52 7.02 13.27
# Supervisors 6.12 19.27 1.00 100.00
Avg. Wage 14.66 1.95 9.90 19.15





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5: Sales as a Function of Supervisory Intensity and Wages
Ratio of Supervisors to Workers —13.4
(2.1)






Mean of the dependent 47.9
N 86
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. This regression also contained
controls for industry (17), area (4), and occupational distribution
of workers (7).
27Table 6: Turnover and Wage Premiums
1 2
Mean Wage —.036 —.031
(015) (.021)
Employment 6 Months Prior —.oooii
(. 00007)
Proportion of Non—exempt Employees in:
















Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the ratio to
total separations of non—exempt workers (excluding temporary layoffs)
in last 6 to total employment of non—exempt workers 6 monthsago.
The mean wage is of non—exempt employees. The mean of the dependent
variable is .25, with mean employment 144 and mean wage $7.45.
Equation 2 includes additional dichotomous variables controlling for 4
areas and 17 detailed industries.
28